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Introduction: In the regulation of involuntary treatment, a balance must be found between duties of care and
protection and the right to self-determination. Despite its shared common roots, the mental health
legislation of Commonwealth countries approaches this balance in different ways. When reform is planned,
lessons can be learned from the experiences of other countries.
Method: Criteria for involuntary treatment used in a sample of 32 Commonwealth Mental Health Acts were
compared using a framework developed from standards derived from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Reasons for non-compliance were considered and examples of good practice were noted. Changes in
the criteria used over time and across areas with differing levels of economic development were analysed.
Results: 1. Widespread deviation from standards was demonstrated, suggesting that some current legislation
may be inadequate for the protection of the human rights of people with mental disorders. 2. Current trends
in Commonwealth mental health law reform include a move towards broad diagnostic criteria, use of
capacity and treatability tests, treatment in the interests of health rather than safety, and regular reviews of
treatment orders. Nevertheless, there are some striking exceptions.
Discussion: Explanations for deviation from the standards include differing value perspectives underpinning
approaches to balancing conﬂicting principles, failure to keep pace with changing attitudes to mental
disorder, and variations in the resources available for providing treatment and undertaking law reform.
Current good practice provides examples of ways of dealing with some of these difﬁculties.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
This article describes and compares mental health law from
countries, which, despite economic and cultural differences, share a
common legal heritage. Our study investigated whether common
ethical and legal principles continue to underpin mental health
legislation and examined factors associated with any diversity that
was established.
Admitting adults to hospital for psychiatric treatment without their
consent remains a controversial issue and challenges the very basis of
modern day clinical practice—that of informed consent. However, since
it is generally recognized that such actionmay sometimes be necessary,
a legal framework is required to deﬁne, and constrain, the circumstances
under which this may take place. There is a balance to be achieved
between, on the one hand, having themeans to respond to the needs of,
and/or risks posed by, a person considered to have a “mental disorder”
who is not consenting to the proposed intervention, and, on the other,ent of Philosophy, University of
ut research on philosophy, law
the University of Cambridge,
dical Ethics.
in).
 license.the risk that the use of such legislation poses with respect to a person's
rights to autonomy. The potential for the political misuse of mental
health legislation, as occurred in the USSR (Chodoff, 1974), in South
Africa during the apartheid era (American Psychiatric Association,
1979), and is reported to be occurring in present day China (Keukens &
van Voren, 2007), also requires that such legislation is underpinned by
clear ethical and legal principles that are acceptable internationally.
The requirement for informed consent is an expression of an
important principle in moral philosophy, namely “respect autonomy”.
Autonomyhas beendeﬁned inmanydifferentways (Dworkin,1988) but
fundamentally it means having the freedom to be self-governing. The
bases of the respect autonomy principle and its justiﬁable limitations
have been the subjects of extensive philosophical debate.
The central arguments in support of the principle are that, on the
one hand, it is unreasonable to override decisions that are the product
of a rational will (Kant, 1997 [1785]) and, on the other, that liberty of
voluntary action is an essential component of happiness (Mill, 1998
[1869]) or is instrumental to its attainment (Brock, 1988). Several
authors have argued that this principle gives rise to a strongmoral claim
or right to autonomy. Thismaybederived froma reasoned claim to equal
respect for dignity alongside other members of the moral community
(Darwall, 2006) or from the necessity of respecting people's interest
in self-determination, in order that they may promote their own best
interests (Feinberg, 1980).
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the prevention of harm to the person him or herself (paternalism) or
of harm to others. Many authors have argued that paternalism is only
justiﬁable if decision-making capacity is signiﬁcantly impaired such
that the choice being overridden is essentially non-voluntary
(McMillan, 2007). Interference to prevent harm to others is justiﬁed
because interference with an assailant's autonomy preserves both
the autonomy and the physical integrity of any potential victims
(Feinberg, 1984; Mill, 1998 [1869]).
Beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United
Nations, 1948) efforts have been made to codify such moral rights.
The UDHR has since been operationalised in the form of enforceable
instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights (Council
of Europe, 1950) the American Convention on Human Rights (Organiza-
tion of American States,1978) and theAfrican (Banjul) Charter onHuman
and Peoples' Rights (Organization of African Unity, 1982).
However, in reality, mental health legislation may not fully reﬂect
either coherentphilosophical arguments or the variousConventionsand
Declarations, since legislation is inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc historical,
social, political, and cultural context in which it is enacted. Arguably,
mental health legislation in general pays insufﬁcient attention to the
human rights of people with mental disorders (Jones, 2005). Such
inattention may reﬂect a wide variety of factors, from shortage of
the necessary economic resources in the context of the enormity of
other problems (Dhanda, 2005), to the dominance within society of a
particular view about the appropriate balance between the delivery of
treatment and respect for autonomy (Chodoff, 1984). Not surprisingly,
therefore, mental health legislation varies widely across the world
(Appelbaum, 1997; Bartlett & Watchirs, 2005; Gray & O'Reilly, 2001;
Zinkler&Priebe, 2002). This picture is reﬂected in theCommonwealth of
Nations, an association of 53 countries with nearly 2 billion citizens
representing a broad range of religious faiths, ethnic groups, cultures
and traditions (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007), which share the
samecommon-lawbasis for legal systems.Within this association, there
is a variety of statutory mental health legislation, both recently enacted
(Watchirs, 2005) and long-standing (Bolis, 2002; Faunce, 2005).
In recent years, guidance has been developed to try to ensure that
national mental health legislation, while reﬂecting the conditions of
the speciﬁc country, complies with human rights instruments derived
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Such guidance takesTable 1
Two models for the protection of human rights through legislation for the regulation of inv
Legal test WHO guidance
Diagnosis “Qualiﬁed mental health professionals… should determine that
the person in question has a mental disorder.” Para 3.1.1
“Evidence of a mental disorder of speciﬁed severity as deﬁned
by internationally accepted standards.” Para 3.1.4
Therapeutic aim
Risk “They should be convinced [of]… a high probability of immediate o
imminent harm to this person or other persons, or, in the case of a
person whose mental disorder is severe and whose judgment is
impaired, that failure to admit or detain that person would probabl
lead to a serious deterioration in his or her condition or would prev
appropriate treatment.” Para 3.1.1
Capacity “Competence to give consent…refers…to the capacity to understan
the purpose, nature and likely effects of a particular treatment”
Para 3.1.8
“Legislation may allow treatment to proceed without informed
consent…if a person…is found to be lacking competence.” Para 3.1.
Review process “Legislative provision for automatic review mechanisms in all cases
of involuntary admission and treatment…Reviews should take plac
at reasonable intervals e.g. no longer than monthly…They should b
conducted by an independent regulatory body with legal or quasi-l
status for the enforcement of good practice.” Para 3.1.7the form of legal principles that should be incorporated in order
to balance the prima facie right to self-determination with other
considerations such as welfare and public safety.
The comparative study of mental health law reported in this article
has been undertaken in response to debates within Great Britain
around recent reform of theMental Health Act 1983 (covering England
and Wales) and the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984. In Scotland,
the enactment of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland)
Act 2003 was relatively non-contentious. However, from the start,
the proposals for England and Wales gave rise to profound disagree-
ments between the Government and the majority of professional and
charitable organizations (Grounds, 2001; Szmukler & Holloway,
2000; Zigmond & Holland, 2000), which remained, at least in part,
unresolved when the amending Mental Health Act 2007 was enacted.
Central to this debate have been arguments about the ethical
principles that, either implicitly, or, as recommended in the Report
of the Expert Committee (Department of Health, 1999), explicitly
inform the law. Respect for autonomy is a key issue, alongside the
related concept of “decision-making capacity” and the role of the
assessment of capacity in determiningwhether compulsory treatment
can and should take place. The relevance of the concept of “decision-
making capacity” to mental health law has gained increasing
prominence, as a result of theoretical analysis supported by evidence
from empirical studies and precedent from case law. This material is
summarised below.
Research suggests that the impairments of cognition, affect and
insight that can characterize serious mental disorders (Ghaemi &
Pope, 1994) may affect the ability to make decisions about treatment
(Murphy & Clare, 2003; Okai et al., 2007); although this is by no
means inevitable (Jacob et al., 2005; Wong, Clare, Holland, Watson, &
Gunn, 2000). Moreover, physical disorders have also been found to
compromise decision-making capacity (Raymont et al., 2004).
When considering authorization of treatment for physical illness in
the absence of consent, the courts have limited their powers to cases
where it is necessary to enable provision of treatment for people who
lack the ability to make autonomous treatment decisions. In one of
the leading cases prior to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Re C (adult:
refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1 All E R 819 (see also the Court of
Appeal decision in Re MB (adult: medical treatment) [1997] 38 BMLR
175), neither status (such as diagnosis of mental disorder) nor adverseoluntary psychiatric treatment.
CE recommendations
“Applies to persons with mental disorder deﬁned in accordance with
internationally accepted medical standards. Lack of adaption to the
moral, social, political or other values of a society, of itself, should
not be considered a mental disorder.” Art 2.
“A person may be subject to involuntary placement only if…the
placement includes a therapeutic purpose.” Art 17.
“Therapeutic purposes include prevention, diagnosis, control or cure of the
disorder, and rehabilitation… Treatment may include measures to improve
the social dimension of a person's life.” Art 2
r
y
ent
“A signiﬁcant risk of serious harm to his or her health or to other persons.”
Arts 17 & 18
d
3
e
e
egal
“Right to appeal against a decision; to have the lawfulness of the measure,
or its continuing application, reviewed by a court at reasonable intervals;
to be heard in person or through a personal advocate or representative at
such reviews or appeals.” Art 25
Table 2
Framework for the comparative analysis of legislation.
Axis 1. Diagnosis
Level 1. No deﬁnition of mental disorder in the legislation, and no standard set for
determining its presence.
Level 2. “Unsoundness of mind” approaches, determined by legal professionals and
emphasize a perceived need for control or containment.
Level 3. “Disability” approaches—based on the presence of phenomena that impair
mental functioning.
Level 4. Broad “disorder” approaches—based on the diagnosis of particular
syndromes or classes of syndrome.
Level 5. Narrow “disorder” approaches—based on an internationally recognized
system of classiﬁcation e.g. ICD-10 or DSM-IV.
Supplement to axis 1—exclusion criteria
If the legislation excluded conditions from being considered grounds for involuntary
treatment, these were also noted and classiﬁed as follows:
Group a) ethnicity; religious, political, cultural or philosophical beliefs or practices.
Group b) criminal, irresponsible or antisocial behaviour.
Group c) sexual preference, identity or practices.
Group d) misuse of alcohol or drugs.
Group e) intellectual disability.
Group f) personality disorder (may be limited to cluster B or to anti-social personality
disorder).
Axis 2. Therapeutic aim
Level 1. No therapeutic intent required —detention justiﬁed by public interest.
Level 2. Requirement for therapeutic intent for involuntary admission.
Level 3. Requirement that treatment for the condition is available.
Level 4. Treatment must be likely to alleviate the condition or prevent deterioration.
Axis 3. Risk
Level 1 Detention permitted when degree of risk is unknown.
Level 2. Broad “health” approaches—detentionneeded to bring about an improvement
in health or ability to function.
Level 3. Narrow “health” approaches—detention needed to prevent deterioration.
Level 4. Broad “safety” approaches—detention needed to prevent a signiﬁcant or
serious deterioration or psychological harm to the patient or others.
Level 5. Narrow “safety” approaches — detention needed to prevent immediate or
imminent physical harm to the patient or others.
Axis 4. Capacity (a. for hospitalization and b. for other treatment)
Level 1. No capacity threshold—treatment permitted without a capacity assessment
or when the patient is able to make a treatment decision.
Level 2. Outcome approaches—the patient makes an irrational choice or the outcome
of the patient's treatment decision is deemed unreasonable.
Level 3. Ability approaches—the patient is found to lack the ability to make the
treatment decision.
Axis 5. Review process
Level 1. No review or appeal process.
Level 2. Right of appeal but no automatic independent legal review.
Level 3. Regular automatic independent legal review.
Level 4. Monthly automatic independent legal review.
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sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for the infringement of a person's autonomy by
imposing treatment without consent.
The British Government were advised that adults' decision-making
capacity should be the pivotal issue in determiningwhether substitute
decision-making was appropriate, regardless of whether the treat-
ment was for a mental or physical disorder (Department of Health,
1999). In Scotland this is now the case; both the Adults with Incapacity
(Scotland) Act 2000 (regulating treatment for physical illness) and the
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (regulating
treatment for mental disorder) include impaired decision-making
capacity or judgment as a criterion for non-consensual treatment.
However, in England and Wales the pivotal role of capacity applies
only to the non-consensual treatment of physical disorder (regulated
by the Mental Capacity Act 2005), not to mental disorders (regulated
from November 2008 by the Mental Health Acts 1983 and 2007).
The aims of this study were as follows: a) to describe existing
mental health legislation in force in Commonwealth countries and to
compare this against standards derived by two cross-national bodies
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: b) to investigate
differences that exist between the mental health legislation in
different countries and consider why they may have arisen; and
c) to seek to identify core principles and procedures common to the
legislation of different jurisdictions.
2. Methods
2.1. Developing a framework
To enable a systematic comparison of statutory legislation to
be carried out, a multi-axial framework was developed from two
consensus statements regarding the regulation of involuntary psy-
chiatric treatment: the WHO Mental Health Policy and Service
Guidance Package–Mental Health Legislation & Human Rights
(World Health Organization, 2003) and REC (2004)10 of the Council
of Europe (Council of Europe, 2004). The guidance in these
statements, which are summarised in Table 1, were both developed
following extensive consultation. They demonstrate different
approaches to the goal of protecting the human rights of people
with mental disorders. The WHO guidelines, drawing on United
Nations Resolution 46/119 (United Nations, 1991), which is, in turn,
derived from the UDHR, propose four key principles for legitimate
involuntary treatment: a review process must be in place, a diagnostic
threshold must be passed, and a risk threshold should be set, which
is variable according to whether an incapacity threshold is passed.
Somewhat different are the Council of Europe (CE) recommendations,
based on the interpretation of instruments such as the European
Convention on Human Rights (also derived from the UDHR) and
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Council of Europe,
1997); they incorporate a review process, a diagnostic threshold, a
therapeutic aim, and a ﬁxed risk threshold.
It should be borne in mind that most of the legislation analysed in
this study was enacted before these two guidance statements were
published, and, in any case, that of the Council of Europe is legally
applicable only to those jurisidictions that are members. We have
incorporated both statements into the framework developed in this
study with the aim of accommodating legitimate differences in
approach towards the protection of human rights—including the
rights of a person with mental disorder to self-determination and
healthcare and the rights of others to self-determination and bodily
integrity.
The framework's axes were derived from the ﬁve legal tests in the
guidance provided by the two statements. Along each axis, possible
approaches to framing the test, derived from a pilot review of a sample
of current mental health legislation, and literature on approaches
to treatment without consent (Appelbaum, 1997; Freeman, Pathare,Drew, Funk, & Saraceno, 2005; Roth, Meisel, & Lidz, 1977) were
categorized and ranked in order of increasing emphasis on autonomy
(Table 2). A legal instrument that incorporated the highest ranked
approach along each axis would exceed the requirements of both the
WHO and CE guidance statements in terms of respect for autonomy.
2.2. Application of the framework
Commonwealth legislation regulating the use of involuntary
psychiatric treatment was traced using the University of Cambridge
law library and internet searches. Since legislation from Africa was
difﬁcult to locate through these sources, we approached the African
Association of Psychiatrists for assistance. Care was taken to ensure
that the study included legislation enacted over a long period of time
(from 1897 to 2007), from countries that were both more and less
economically developed, and representing diverse historical and
cultural traditions.
To enablemeaningful comparisonwith theguidance, broader criteria
for short-term assessment or emergency treatment orders and other
legal or quasi-legal instruments regarding involuntary psychiatric
treatment (e.g. guardianship legislation, codes of practice and case
law) were not included.
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taken to the drafting of the legal tests on each of the framework's
ﬁve axes. Every Act was given an “autonomy score” (minimum = 6,
maximum = 30), calculated by summing the rank score on each axis,
plus the types of exclusion criteria. This gives an indication of the
weight given to the “respect autonomy” principle in comparison with
other considerations, such as patient health or public safety. A high
score indicates greater restrictions on the use of involuntary treatment.
Compared with a legislation which gains a lower score, therefore, it
accords relatively more weight to the principle of respect for patient
autonomy and less weight to other principles such as health promotion
or public safety.
3. Results
Thirty-two examples of legislation were traced; seven of these
were from less economically developed countries with a gross
national income per capita between $600 and $4180, and 25 from
more economically developed countries with a gross national income
per capita between $19,990 and $33,630. Whilst mental health
legislation from the majority of jurisdictions in the North American,
Australasian, Asian and European Commonwealth was traced, it
was only possible to trace legislation from three jurisdictions in the
Caribbean and one in the African Commonwealth. Two further Asian
Acts, nine Caribbean Acts and 11 African Acts were identiﬁed but
copies of the legislation could not be traced. Nonetheless, the analysis
includes legislation from a diverse range of jurisdictions, including
some not previously included in this type of comparative analysis.
The results of the coding are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Table 5 shows
the variation in approaches to drafting the legal tests according to
the age of the legislation and the jurisdiction's level of economic
development.
Overall autonomy scores ranged from 8 to 25. The CE recommenda-
tions and WHO guidance scored 15 and 16 respectively, and the mean
score for all Acts was 15.4, suggesting that a score in the mid teens
indicates that legislation achieves a balance between the “respect
autonomy” principle and other considerations that is acceptable by
current standards.
Over time, mean autonomy scores tend to rise: from 8.7 for the
oldest Acts, 15.4 for those enacted in the 1980s and 14.9 in the 1990s,
to 18.1 for legislation enacted since 2000. Themean autonomy score in
more economically developed countries was 16.4, compared with a
mean score of 12 in less economically developed countries (14.5 if
the three oldest Acts are excluded). The new legislation for England
and Wales is an interesting example as, with a score of 12, it does not
follow these trends.
None of the Acts was judged clearly compliant with all of theWHO
guidance, although South Africa, Jamaica and ﬁve Canadian states fell
short only on the stringent requirement for monthly reviews. FourTable 3
Results of the coding process in areas with gross national income per capita US$ 600-4 180
Origin of framework Date Diagnosis Exclusion criteria
abcdef1
Treatability Risk
+++++ ++++ +++++
WHO 2003 +++ + ++++/++
Council of Europe 2004 +++ a ++ ++++
Sri Lanka 1873 ++ + ++
Grenada 1895 ++ + +
St Lucia 1895 ++ + +
India 1987 ++++ e + ++
Jamaica 1999 +++ + ++
Pakistan 2001 ++++ cd + ++
South Africa 2002 +++++ a + ++
Number of + signs indicates the level of the framework the legislation is judged to have re
1 a) ethnicity; religious, political, cultural or philosophical beliefs or practices, b) crim
d) misuse of alcohol or drugs, e) intellectual disability, f) personality disorder (may be limiAustralian states were judged compliant with all of the CE recom-
mendations. Compliance along each axis is considered in more detail
below:
3.1. Axis one. Diagnosis
Both the WHO and CE guidance statements suggest including
a diagnostic test, based on internationally accepted standards, in
legislation. Most legislation appeared compliant. However, nine Acts
include very broad diagnostic criteria that, without other safeguards,
could lead to non-compliance. The incorporation of a diagnostic test
clearly based on internationally accepted standards is most prevalent
in legislation enacted during the 1980s. Older legislation uses an
“unsound mind” approach, based on judicial rather than medical
determination of mental disorder. After the 1980s, there is a trend in
countries that are more economically developed to incorporate a very
broad deﬁnition of mental disorder, tempered in all but two cases by a
test of “therapeutic aim” or multiple exclusion criteria.
3.2. Axis two. Therapeutic aim
The CE recommendations suggest a requirement that all instances of
involuntary admission have a therapeutic aim. Only a minority of Acts
(12/32) appear compliant. The incorporation of a test of therapeutic aim
ismore prevalent both inmore economically developed countries and in
legislation enacted since 2000.
3.3. Axis three. Risk
Both theWHO and CE guidance statements suggest that involuntary
admission should be limited to cases where there is a risk of signiﬁcant
or serious deterioration. If judgment is impaired, the WHO guidance
recommends that the threshold is lowered to a need for treatment to
improve health. NineteenActswith a test based on serious deterioration
appear compliant with both statements. A further two Acts with a test
based on need for treatment plus a capacity test for hospitalization
appear compliant with theWHO guidance. Incorporation of a test based
on risk to safety or risk of serious deterioration is most prevalent
in legislation enacted in the 1980s and 1990s. Themajority of legislation
enacted since 2000 incorporates a test based on need for treatment. This
trend is accompanied by increasing use of capacity tests.
3.4. Axis four. Capacity
The WHO guidance suggests a test based on inability to make
treatment decisions for the hospitalization of low-risk patients and for
the administration of further treatment to all patients. Only eight Acts
appear compliant with this standard: Scotland and South Africa set an
ability-based capacity test for hospitalization and treatment, while a.
Incapacity (admission) Incapacity (treatment) Review process Autonomy rating
(6–30)+++ +++ ++++
+/+++ +++ ++++ 16
+ + +++ 15
++ ++ + 10
+ + ++ 8
+ + ++ 8
+ + ++ 12
+ +++ +++ 13
+ +++ ++ 15
+++ +++ +++ 18
ached, maximum indicated at top of column.
inal, irresponsible or antisocial behaviour, c) sexual preference, identity or practices,
ted to cluster B or to anti-social PD).
Table 4
Results of the coding process in areas with gross national income per capita US9 990–33 630.
Origin of framework Date
enacted
Diagnosis Exclusion
criteria
Treatability Risk Incapacity
(admission)
Incapacity
(treatment)
Review process Autonomy
rating
(6–30)+++++ abcdef2 ++++ +++++ +++ +++ ++++
WHO 2003 +++ + ++++/++ +/+++ +++ ++++ 16
Council of Europe 2004 +++ a ++ ++++ + + +++ 15
England & Wales 1983 ++++ cd ++++3/+ ++ + + +++ 15
Northern Ireland 1986 +++ + +++++ + + ++ 13
Saskatchewan (Canada) 1986 +++ ++ ++++ +++ +++ +++ 18
Northwest Territories (Canada) 1988 +++ e + +++++ + +++ +++ 17
Prince Edward Island (Canada) 1988 +++ e + +++++ + +++ +++ 17
Nova Scotia (Canada) 1989 +++ + +++++ + +++ +++ 16
Newfoundland (Canada) 1990 + + +++++ + + ++ 11
New South Wales (Australia)4 1990 + abcde + ++++ + + +++ 16
South Australia 1993 + +++ ++++ + + +++ 13
Australian Capital Territory 1994 +++ abcde ++++ ++++ + + +++ 21
New Brunswick (Canada) 1994 +++ e + ++++ + + +++ 14
British Columbia (Canada) 1996 +++ + +++ + + ++ 11
Tasmania (Australia) 1996 +++ ab e +++ ++++ + + +++ 18
Western Australia 1996 +++ abcde +++ ++ + + +++ 18
Manitoba (Canada) 1998 +++ e ++ ++++ + + +++ 15
Quebec (Canada) 1998 + + ++++ + + ++ 10
New Zealand 1999 +++ abcdef + ++++ + + +++ 19
Alberta (Canada) 2000 +++ ++++ +++++ + + +++ 17
Ontario (Canada) 2000 + +/++++ +++++/++++ +/+++5 +++ +++ 16
Queensland (Australia) 2000 +++ abcde +++ ++++ ++ ++ +++ 21
Yukon (Canada) 2002 +++ + +++++ + +++ +++ 16
Scotland 2003 ++++ bcd ++++ +++ +++ +++ ++ 22
Victoria (Australia) 2003 +++ abcdef +++ ++ + + +++ 19
Northern Territory (Australia) 2005 +++++ abcdef +++ ++++ ++ ++ +++ 25
England & Wales 2007 + de ++ ++ + + +++ 12
2 a) ethnicity; religious, political, cultural or philosophical beliefs or practices, b) criminal, irresponsible or antisocial behaviour, c) sexual preference, identity or practices, d)
misuse of alcohol or drugs, e) intellectual disability, f) personality disorder (may be limited to cluster B or to anti-social PD).
3 Treatability test only applies to diagnostic categories roughly equivalent to personality disorder and mild to moderate intellectual disability.
4 NSW legislation has been updated since this analysis was conducted, with new legislation enacted in 2007.
5 Thresholds for treatability and incapacity vary with level of risk.
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ewan, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia) permit the involuntary
hospitalization only of high-risk patients, with an ability-based
capacity test for their further treatment. The incorporation of aTable 5
Variation in approaches to threshold setting and compliance with standards a) over time a
Legal test Modal category6 Percentage compl
CE standards
old 80s 90s 00s Old 80s
Diagnosis Unsound
mind
Disability Disability Disability 0 (0/3) 100(7
++ +++ +++ +++
Treatability None
+
None
+
None
+
Effective for
condition/effective
for individual7
+++/++++
100(3/3) 100 (7
0 (0/3) 14 (1
Risk None
+
Narrow safety
+++++
Broad safety
++++
Broad health
++
0 (0/3) 71 (5
0 (0/3) 71 (5
Incapacity
(admission)
None
+
None
+
None
+
None
+
0 (0/3) 71 (5
100 (3/3) 100 (7
Incapacity
(treatment)
None
+
Ability
+++
None
+
Ability
+++
0 (0/3) 57 (4
100 (3/3) 100 (7
Review
procedure
Appeal
++
Review
+++
Review
+++
Review
+++
0 (0/3) 0 (0
0 (0/3) 71 (5
6 Refer to Table 2 for the deﬁnitions of each category.
7 Bimodal distribution.
8 Bimodal distribution.capacity test is most prevalent in more economically developed
countries and in legislation enacted in the 1980s or since 2000.
The remaining Acts appear to permit the provision of some form of
psychiatric treatment without consent (deﬁned broadly to includend b) according to gross national income per capita.
iance with WHO and Modal category1 Percentage
compliance with
WHO and CE
standards
90s 00s Low
income
High
income
Low
income
High
income
/7) 67(8/12) 80(8/10) Unsound
mind
Disability 57(4/7) 76(19/25)
++ +++
/7) 100(12/12) 100(10/10) None
+
None
+
100(3/3) 100(25/25)
/7) 42 (5/12) 60 (6/10) 0 (0/3) 48 (12/25)
/7) 75 (9/12) 70 (7/10) Broad health
++
Broad safety
++++
14 (1/7) 80 (20/25)
/7) 75 (9/12) 50 (5/10) 0 (0/7) 76 (19/25)
/7) 75 (9/12) 70 (7/10) None
+
None
+
0 (0/7) 80 (20/25)
/7) 100(12/12) 100(10/10) 100 (7/7) 100(25/25)
/7) 1 (1/12) 50 (5/10) None
+
None/Ability8
+/+++
0 (0/7) 28 (7/25)
/7) 100(12/12) 100(10/10) 100 (7/7) 100(25/25)
/7) 0 (0/12) 0 (0/10) Appeal
++
Review
+++
0 (0/7) 0 (0/25)
/7) 75 (9/12) 80 (8/10) 29 (2/7) 80 (20/25)
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decisions. This group includes legislation that permits involuntary
treatment for patients who “unreasonably refuse” and legislation
that prevents the administration without consent of some (usually
invasive or irreversible) forms of psychiatric treatment but permits
other forms.
3.5. Axis ﬁve. Review process
The CE recommendations suggest an automatic independent legal
or quasi-legal review of decisions to detain patients, while the WHO
guidance suggests intervals of 1 month between reviews. Twenty-
two Acts appear compliant with the CE standard; none meets the
WHO standard. Incorporation of review procedures is more prevalent
in more economically developed countries.
4. Discussion
It would not be reasonable to expect that the legislation included
in this analysis would all comply with the guidance statements
produced by the WHO and the Council of Europe: a) most of the
legislation was enacted prior to the publication of the statements, b)
the two statements are based on different approaches, and c) only the
guidance produced by the WHO was intended to be applicable on all
continents. Nevertheless, non-compliance raises an alert that a
particular piece of legislation may not adequately safeguard human
rights. Our analysis, suggesting considerable variation in the criteria
for involuntary admission and treatment, indicates that compliance
across the Commonwealth is variable. Possible explanations include
differing value perspectives, failure to keep pace with changing
attitudes to mental disorder, and variations in the resources available
for providing treatment and undertaking law reform. Each of these
factors is considered below.
As expected, the analysis suggests that diagnostic thresholds vary
with the age of legislation. Acts drafted before effective treatments
for mental illness became available use the “unsoundness of mind”
approach, emphasizing containment rather than treatment and
appearing to reﬂect attitudes towards men and womenwith a mental
disorder that have now, at least in principle (Thornicroft, 2006), been
superceded.
Modern Commonwealth legislation uses a variety of deﬁnitions of
mental disorder. A deﬁnition that is too broad is open to abuse, while
one that is too narrow risks excluding people who might beneﬁt from
involuntary treatment (Department of Health, 1999). The most recent
development is the use of very broad approaches, arguably too broad
to provide meaningful guidance. This could be interpreted as leaving
the task of diagnosis to those with medical expertise, so that no one in
need of treatment is inadvertently excluded, and emphasizing the
duty of care over the right to self-determination. However, stringent
safeguards such as exclusion criteria would be required to reduce the
risk of overly paternalistic interpretations.
The principle of reciprocity has been proposed as one way of
balancing respect for self-determination with the duty of public
protection (Eastman, 1994). Restrictions of liberty that extend beyond
the tariff for a criminal offence may be justiﬁed if the person being
restricted stands to gain some beneﬁt. A test of therapeutic aim,
therefore, provides a means for achieving reciprocity and such a test
is found in the CE recommendations. Arguably, a right to treatment
is meaningless for a person detained on the basis of a condition that
is not amenable to treatment (Harris, 2007) and treatability tests
are increasingly being adopted in more economically developed
countries. Some jurisdictions have used an alternative method to
support reciprocity, the exclusion of “untreatable” conditions. Intel-
lectual disability is a lifelong condition and is the most widespread
exclusion criterion found in this study. Elsewhere, a lack of reciprocitymay be considered unjust by the courts yet may persist due to lack of
resources for treatment (Dhanda, 2005).
The drafting of risk and capacity tests is strongly inﬂuenced by
value perspectives, which may explain the different approaches
adopted by the WHO and the CE. In the 1970s and 80s, increasing
emphasis on civil liberties was associated with a move towards
stringent risk tests. Restrictions on the freedom of individuals, even
thosewhose judgement was impaired, were only justiﬁed in the name
of preventing signiﬁcant harm (Appelbaum, 1997). This was con-
ﬁrmed by this study, with a stringent test found in the majority of
modern legislation.
However, the change in approach has not been without its critics.
Disorders that compromise insight, volition and mental capacity may
prevent those affected from seeking treatment that they might
otherwise accept, and untreated psychosis is associated with social
exclusion and poor outcomes (Drake, Haley, Akhtar, & Lewis, 2000).
The trend towards stringent risk tests has harmed some people with
mental disorders who refuse treatment and, as a result, now live
marginalized and socially excluded lives (Peele & Chodoff, 1999). This
may explain our ﬁnding of less stringent risk tests in some of the most
recently enacted legislation from Pakistan, South Africa, Scotland,
Victoria (Australia) and England and Wales.
When a less stringent test is adopted, an alternative mechanism
is required to avoid overly paternalistic treatment of people who
are able to make their own decisions Capacity assessment is the
mechanism suggested by the WHO and underlies both reason-based
approaches that accord absolute respect to rational choices (Kant,1997
[1785]), and utilitarian and rights-based approaches that reject “hard”
paternalism but permit “soft” paternalism when decision-making is
impaired (Brock, 1988; Feinberg, 1980; Mill, 1998 [1869]). In contrast
with the 1980s and 1990s, when a “stringent risk test-no capacity test”
approachwas themost frequent approach,we found that, in legislation
enacted since 2000, 50% (5/10) of the Acts we identiﬁed had adopted
some form of capacity threshold for hospitalization. It is interesting
to note that both the “stringent risk test” and the “capacity-based”
approaches are legitimate alternatives for the regulation of involuntary
treatment within some jurisdictions. For example, most Australian
States have a stringent risk test and no capacity test in their mental
health legislation but all allow health-care decisions to be made on
behalf of incapacitated adults under guardianship legislation (such
legislationwas not included in our analysis, whichwas limited tomore
speciﬁc mental health legislation), which uses a low risk threshold
based on best interests and an ability-based capacity test. Both types of
legislation generate similar autonomy scores.
Nonetheless, the strongly paternalistic combination of a low risk
threshold and low incapacity threshold is still being adopted. This
may be due to the use of the outcome-based approach to capacity,
permitting compulsory treatment in cases of unreasonable refusal
(Roth et al., 1977). Such an approach is explicitly adopted in two
Australian states (Queensland and the Northern Territory) and
implicit in an approach taken elsewhere when competent refusals
carry more weight when invasive or burdensome treatment is
concerned (for example, in England and Wales where, according to
ss57–58 of the Mental Health Act 1983, competent refusals of highly
invasive treatment must be respected and competent refusals of
burdensome treatment can only be overriddenwith the support of an
independent second opinion). Although this outcome-based approach
is sanctioned in UN Resolution 46/119 (principle 11, paragraph 6b), it
has been criticized as tending to result in individuals being judged to
lack decision-making capacity if they disagree with their doctor
(Gunn, 1994), making the “ability” standard preferable.
Another possible reason, relevant to legislation that makes no
reference to capacity, is a tacit application of a status-based approach
(Roth et al., 1977), based upon the assumption that all members of
a particular group (in this case, people diagnosed with a mental
disorder) lack decision-making capacity. This assumption is erroneous:
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capable ofmaking treatment decisions (for example, Bellhouse, Holland,
Clare, Watson, & Gunn, 2003a; Wong et al., 2000) and this capacity can
be reliably assessed using a checklist derived from legal deﬁnitions
(Bellhouse, Holland, Clare, Watson, & Gunn, 2003b).
Finally, both the guidance statements require regular independent
reviews to ensure that decisions to detain and treat are onlymadewhen
patients meet the threshold criteria, meaning that self-determination is
only limited when this is shown to be necessary. Review mechanisms
provide a more robust safeguard against inappropriate detention than
appeal processes, as they are not initiated by the patient, who may be
subject to undue inﬂuence or lack resources to take a case to court.
However, reviews can be costly in terms of ﬁnancial resources and the
timeof clinicians, possiblycompromising clinical care, and somaynotbe
given high priority when patients are not objecting to treatment. This
could explain the ﬁnding that the majority of low resource countries in
this study had no automatic review process. Given evidence that “there
is a basic problem in every country in the world: that the supply of
treatment and care is less or far less than the actual need” (Thornicroft,
2006 p267), such costs may also contribute to the lack of compliance
with the stringentWHOguidance on reviewmechanisms thatwe found
even in those jurisdictions that are more economically developed.
Data on rates of detention under different legal systems suggest
that factors other than legal criteria inﬂuence decisions to detain a
patient (Appelbaum, 1997; Zinkler & Priebe, 2002). This study does
not does not show how closely the legislation is adhered to in practice
in any given country. Further research, of the type carried out by in the
UK by Quirk (Quirk, Lelliot, Audini, & Buston, 2000) and in the USA by
Hoge (Hoge et al., 1997, 1998), is needed to investigate ways in which
different legal regulations are interpreted in practice and affect the
experiences of people with a mental disorder.
In summary, differences in value judgments regarding underlying
principles, attitudes to mental disorder, and resource availability
may all contribute to variation in criteria for involuntary treatment.
Ideally, legislation should accommodate heterogeneous values,
including those of patients who may value their liberty over their
health or vice versa (Fulford, 2004). It should not be based upon
attitudes contradicted by research evidence. Where resources are an
issue, richer nations could assist to ensure that the human rights of
people of all nations are respected.
Following from the ﬁndings reported in this paper, a combination
of examples of good practice from seven jurisdictions with relatively
recent mental health legislation were used to produce suggested
threshold criteria for the protection of people who may be subject to
involuntary psychiatric treatment. These suggestions reﬂect current
standards, described by the WHO and CE guidance statements, and
trends, demonstrated by the data presented in this paper, and are
informed by the ethical theory we have outlined in the Introduction.
1. A diagnostic test based on functional impairment and symptoms,
informed by the ICD-10. This was the most prevalent approach
found in this study. It is based upon a social model of mental
disorder and focuses on the difﬁculties being experienced by the
patient. Although, in comparison with the syndrome-based
approach, it is more difﬁcult to operationalise, it is transparent to
people without medical training (Freeman et al., 2005). It can be
structured to cover only problems associated with serious mental
disorder, such as those listed in ICD-10 (World Health Organization,
1992), avoiding the potential problem of over-inclusiveness leading
to abuse. An example is used in Northern Territory, Australia: “a
condition that seriously impairs, either temporarily or perma-
nently, the mental functioning of a person in one or more areas of
thought, mood, volition, perception, orientation or memory and is
characterized (a) by the presence of at least one of the following
symptoms: delusions, hallucinations, serious disorders of the
stream of thought, serious disorders of thought form, seriousdisturbances of mood or (b) by sustained or repeated irrational
behaviour that may be taken to indicate the presence of at least one
of the symptoms referred to in (a).”
2. Exclusion criteria for the prevention of themisuse of psychiatry as a
means of political or social control. The use of ethnic, political,
religious or cultural status as an exclusion is noticeable in the
legislation of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, all of which
have an unfortunate history of oppression of indigenous peoples.
An example is used in New Zealand, where use of involuntary
treatment solely for reasons including “political, religious or
cultural beliefs…sexual preferences…criminal or delinquent beha-
viour…” is not allowed. Additional guidelines suggest that the Act
should not be applied in cases of psychosexual disorder or anti-
social personality disorder if an individual chooses to act and can
take responsibility for the outcome, linking self-determination
with personal responsibility.
3. A treatability test, requiring that treatment likely to alleviate the
effects of the disorder, or prevent it worsening, is available for the
patient. A treatability test is a robust means of achieving reciprocity
(Eastman, 1994) without the need for constant revision of a list of
“untreatable” exclusions. Personality disorders, sometimes
excluded from use as a justiﬁcation for involuntary treatment, are
widely believed to be lifelong conditions although recent evidence
challenges this assumption (Tyrer et al., 2007). The suggested
approach is more stringent than the current Council of Europe
standard (therapeutic intent), which has been criticized because
reciprocity is not achieved unless the detained person receives a
beneﬁt (Harris, 2007). An example is used in Scotland: “treatment
which would be likely to prevent the mental disorder worsening or
alleviate any of the symptoms, or effects, of the disorder, is available
for the patient”.
4. A risk test based on welfare interests. A relatively low threshold
reduces the risk of disability associated with long duration of
untreated psychosis, and is consistent with WHO standards if
combinedwith a suitable capacity test. An example of the approach
is used in both the Pakistani and English legislation: treatment “is
necessary for the health… of the patient”.
5. A capacity test based on decision-making ability. In many common-
law jurisdictions, the status and outcome-based approaches to
evaluating capacity to consent to treatment for physical ill-health
have been replaced by a test of ability to understand relevant
information (Kennedy & Grubb, 2000). When mental health
legislation preserves an exception to this general principle for
psychiatric treatment, unjustiﬁed discrimination may occur. The
ability approach can be found in the South African legislation which
requires that the patient must not be given involuntary treatment
unless he or she is “incapable of making an informed decision on the
need for the care, treatment and rehabilitation services.” In Queens-
land, Australia, capacity to make treatment decisions is deﬁned as:
“capable of understanding the nature and effect of decisions…and
freely and voluntarily making decisions…and communicating the
decisions in some way.”
6. Special provisions for the treatment of people who pose a high
risk to others. Following the principle of utility (Mill, 2001 [1861]),
one exception to the approach to risk and capacity described above
would be acceptable—the involuntary treatment of people who
have the capacity to refuse treatment, but represent a signiﬁcant
risk to others that could be reduced with such treatment. To avoid
discrimination towards people with mental rather than physical
disorders, a limited form of the narrow safety approach that
excludes risk to self would be needed. This is consistent with the
approach of many common-law jurisdictions to competent refusals
of treatment for physical illness; they are not overridden even if
this will lead to the patient's death (Kennedy & Grubb, 2000). The
exception is statutory provisions to override refusals of treatment
for physical illness that place other people at signiﬁcant risk of
154 E.C. Fistein et al. / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 32 (2009) 147–155harm, for example through the spread of infectious disease. The use
of risk of serious harm as a justiﬁcation for involuntary hospitaliza-
tion can be problematic due to the fallibility of risk assessment.
Serious assault by people with mental disorder is rare and the false
positive rate is likely to be high (Szmukler, 2003; Taylor & Gunn,
1999). A safeguard against unnecessary restriction of liberty could
involve making this type of detention part of the criminal justice
system, applied to people who would otherwise serve a prison
sentence. An example is found in Scotland, where an order for
lifelong restriction (OLR) can be imposed after risk assessment of a
person convicted of a violent offence, combined with a hospital
order in cases of mental disorder (Darjee & Crichton, 2002). After a
tariff for the offence had been served, release is dependent on
the level of continuing risk of serious recidivism. Offenders are
released on licence, subject to conditions intended to reduce risk
and recalled if those conditions are not met. It is anticipated that
most OLRs will be applied to people with personality disorders
(Tuddenham & Baird, 2007).
7. Regular tribunal reviews of patients made subject to involuntary
treatment. An example is the system used in Northern Territory,
Australia. All involuntary admissions and orders for involuntary
outpatient treatment must be reviewed by tribunal within 1 week.
Thereafter, involuntary admissions must be reviewed by tribunal
every 3 months and community management orders reviewed
every 6 months. Patients, and persons with a legitimate interest in
their wellbeing, may appeal against involuntary admissions and
community management orders. Voluntary admissions must be
reviewed by tribunal every 6 months to ensure that the patient is
capable of giving informed consent.
Mental health legislation based on these seven features would,
according to our analysis, have an “autonomy score” of 20. This is
comparable to the scores achieved through the use of theWHO and CE
guidance (16 and 15 respectively) and should therefore be sufﬁcient to
protect the human rights of men and women with a mental disorder
without compromising the provision of treatment to those in need.
One of the most striking ﬁndings of this study results from recent
law reform in the UK. Before 2003, there was little difference between
English and Scottish criteria for involuntary psychiatric treatment.
Since then, approaches to diagnostic, treatability and capacity tests
have diverged. The Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act
2003 has an autonomy score of 22. In stark contrast, theMental Health
Acts 1983 and 2007, which operate in England and Wales, have an
autonomy score of 12. It remains to be seen whether these changes
will translate into differences in clinical outcomes.
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